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Abstract 
How do algorithms shape the imaginary and practice of security? Does their proliferation point to a shift 
in the political rationality of security? If so, what is the nature and extent of that shift? This article argues 
that efforts to strengthen global health security are major drivers in the development and proliferation of 
new algorithmic security technologies. In response to a seeming epidemic of potentially lethal infectious 
disease outbreaks – like HIV, SARS, pandemic flu, MERS, Ebola and Zika – governments and 
international organizations are now using several next-generation syndromic surveillance systems to 
rapidly detect new outbreaks globally. This article analyses the origins, design and function of three such 
internet-based surveillance systems: 1) the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases, 2) the Global 
Public Health Intelligence Network, and 3) HealthMap. The article shows how each newly-introduced 
system became progressively more reliant upon algorithms to mine an ever-growing volume of indirect 
data sources for the earliest signs of a possible new outbreak – gradually propelling algorithms into the 
heart of global outbreak detection. That turn to the algorithm marks a significant shift in the underlying 
problem, nature, and role of knowledge in contemporary security policy. 
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Introduction 
Rapid advancements in automated and digital inter-connectivity during the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries have spawned new ways of imagining and practicing security. In particular, a wide array of 
algorithmic-driven technologies now seek to harness the data-based, predictive capacities imbued in these 
developments in order to inform governments about the probability of threats that are as yet unforeseen. 
Such algorithmic technologies represent new strategic instruments of security and pre-emption – 
especially through their seeming capacity to infinitely amass, aggregate and transcribe unintelligible mass 
data sets, thus rendering visible and intelligible future-facing knowledge for the rapid identification of 
insecurity. The increasing integration and centrality of such automated and algorithmic technologies 
within a broad spectrum of contemporary security practice has already been documented – for example, in 
relation to the proliferation of digital algorithms for human iris detection at airports and national borders 
(Daugman, 2004), in relation to automated identification capacities for enhanced surveillance within 
human biometrics and facial recognition programmes (Introna and Wood, 2004), and – more generally – 
within the context of homeland securitization in the ‘War on Terror’ in the United States and elsewhere 
(Amoore, 2009). In fact, digital algorithmic processes appear increasingly ubiquitous within the security 
and surveillance strategies of the twenty-first century.  
 Efforts to strengthen global health security are a major, if frequently overlooked, driver for the 
development and international proliferation of such new algorithmic security technologies. The 
experience of a seeming epidemic of new epidemics over the past two decades – from HIV/AIDS, SARS 
and pandemic flu, through to MERS, Ebola and Zika – has begun to re-contour perspectives of insecurity, 
and accorded greater international political centrality to the threat that international public health 
emergencies can pose for populations, economies, states and infrastructures (Elbe, 2006, 2007a; Lakoff, 
2008; 2015; Samimian-Darash, 2011). Already these repeated outbreak experiences have compelled many 
governments to make the protection of their populations and economies against the emergence of new, 
lethal infectious diseases an explicit part of the national security strategies (Elbe, 2009; 2010; 2014). Like 
so many other areas of security practice, policy discourses on global health security similarly resonate 
now with notions of ‘early detection’, ‘pre-emption’ and ‘response’.  
 Algorithms are central to these developments because they have enabled the creation of several 
next-generation syndromic surveillance systems now routinely used by governments and international 
organizations to rapidly detect new infectious disease outbreaks occurring around the world. In the United 
Kingdom, Public Health England (2015) defines syndromic surveillance as ‘the process of collecting, 
analysing and interpreting health-related data to provide an early warning of human or veterinary public 
health threats, which require public health action.’ The precise definition and application of syndromic 
surveillance systems still varies considerably in practice, and remains subject to scholarly debate – with 
some scholars even noting underlying ‘confusion about the terminology’ (Morse 2012: 9). Indeed, 
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Henning (2004:1-2) observes, ‘specific definitions for syndromic surveillance are lacking and the name 
itself remains imprecise’ – with the term presently being used to cover a wide array of early warning and 
outbreak detection systems. Notwithstanding those competing definitions, Morse rightly suggests that 
most definitions of syndromic surveillance ‘highlight the use of “non-diagnostic” data – that is, 
information on possible health events before, or without, definite laboratory confirmation’ (Morse 2012: 
9).  
 Syndromic surveillance thus marks a departure from more traditional forms of public health 
surveillance, which tended to rely upon the reporting of official scientific and statistical health 
information to guide responses to emergent health emergencies. By contrast, digital syndromic 
surveillance functions through the constant, omnipresent and (near) real-time monitoring, collection and 
reporting of a range of non-diagnostic (and often open-source) data to detect early signals of a new 
infectious disease outbreak. Rather than waiting for the older, and usually lengthier, process of direct 
clinical and laboratory confirmation of a new infectious disease outbreak, syndromic surveillance systems 
continuously monitor a wide range of more indirect data – such as reports from hospital emergency 
departments, hospital admissions, sales of medicines from pharmacies, telephone calls to health advice 
providers, levels of absenteeism at school and/or workplace, etc. – for early indications that a new 
outbreak or even a bioterrorist attack may have occurred (Public Health Action Programme Triple S-
AGE, 2010). The main idea behind the use of such ‘proxy’ data is that if a novel infectious disease breaks 
out, then informal signals of unusual clusters of illnesses may surface before any official clinical and 
laboratory analysis can be undertaken. For example, people suddenly becoming ill may start to search for 
unusual symptoms on internet search engines, may begin to purchase over the counter remedies, or may 
decide to stay home from work or school. Through closely and continuously monitoring these early, 
preclinical signals it may become possible to considerably speed up the process of outbreak detection – 
thus gaining vital time for preparing a government response.  
 Over the years the type (and spectrum) of data that such systems can draw upon has gradually 
expanded. This has given rise rise to a new set of syndromic surveillance systems analysing a much wider 
variety of non-traditional data sources for such early signs of an outbreak (Morse, 2012: 9). In particular, 
the past two decades have witnessed the creation of several new syndromic surveillance systems 
harnessing the growing availability of open source public health news and information that is now widely 
available and/or exchanged over the internet (Zhang, Dang, Chen, and Thurmond , 2009: 509). The wager 
behind these internet- and news-based syndromic surveillance systems is that new cases of unusual 
symptoms, illness or death occurring anywhere around the world might well become the subject of local 
media reports, or online discussion, long before a government can officially confirm a new outbreak and 
report it to the relevant international health organizations. Such syndromic surveillance systems are now 
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extensively relied upon by the World Health Organization for their international outbreak detection 
activities (Wilson and Brownstein, 2009; Zhang, Dang, Chen, and Thurmond, 2009: 509).  
 Yet processing the immense volume of indirect and mass data sets in near real time is a 
substantial challenge. That is why automated algorithmic technologies are increasingly relied upon to 
report and transcribe the potentially dangerous geographies of global health. Within this era of ‘Big Data’, 
in which continually-generating and widely accessible open-source data streams provide ‘the ability…to 
harness information in novel ways to produce useful insights’, the algorithm has emerged as a creditable 
knowledge logic for managing the means through which information is produced, circulated, and 
consumed in a complex informational society (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013:2; Gillespie, 
2013:191). This article traces the origins, design and function of three novel online syndromic 
surveillance systems for strengthening global health security: 1) the Program for Monitoring Emerging 
Diseases, 2) the Global Public Health Intelligence Network, and 3) HealthMap. The articles shows each 
new system has become progressively more reliant upon algorithms to continuously mine an ever-
growing volume of indirect data sources for the earliest signs of a possible new outbreak – propelling 
algorithms into the heart of global outbreak detection. That turn towards the algorithm signals a 
significant shift in terms of how knowledge is problematized, the kind of knowledge that is produced, and 
the underlying role that knowledge performs in contemporary security practices. 
 
1. First Steps: The Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMed-mail) 
Governments wishing to protect their populations and economies against new infectious disease outbreaks 
want to be alerted of a new outbreak as quickly as possible. Time is considered critical for acquiring a 
better understanding of the nature, epidemiology and likely spread of the new disease. It is also crucial for 
preparing government responses and – where necessary – readying healthcare systems for a surge in 
patients. Yet governments have historically encountered at least two obstacles in achieving rapid 
international outbreak detection. 
First, because new outbreaks can occur anywhere in the world, governments are effectively 
reliant upon the honesty (and capability) of other governments to rapidly and accurately report new 
infectious disease outbreaks to the rest of the international community where and when they occur. In the 
past many governments have been loath to be candid and forthcoming about such new outbreaks, due to 
fears about the possible impact of such news on trade, tourism and so forth. At the apex of the SARS 
epidemic emerging in southern China in 2002-2003, for example, international public health experts had 
to confront the spectre of Chinese state sovereignty and significant government stone-walling. Yet 
international health organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) could not officially take 
action until China had come forward to formally notify them of the outbreak. Such ‘political’ challenges 
in attaining timely and verified outbreak data in the case of SARS highlighted significant discrepancies 
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between the monitoring and reporting of infectious disease outbreaks, as well as an over-reliance on 
nationally-curated health information, within global health surveillance initiatives. The political 
sovereignty of other countries thus represents one pertinent obstacle to a more rapid and reliable system 
of global outbreak detection.  
In addition to potential ‘political’ interference with rapid infectious disease outbreak reporting, a 
second challenge stems from the traditionally lengthy process of scientifically confirming and notifying 
the presence of a new infectious disease. The process of safely collecting samples of new microbes, 
conducting complex laboratory analyses, and feeding the information through the relevant government 
channels can prove a lengthy process, and also one prone to bureaucratic delays and/or errors. In 
reflecting upon an outbreak of poliomyelitis in Guinea in 1967/68, for example, Weir and Mykhalovisky 
(2010:118), argue that within these older governmental systems of health surveillance ‘[o]utbreak and 
epidemic control occurred in local time and place, were weakly articulated to both official and unofficial 
knowledge in the first weeks of onset, and were incorporated in national and global time after the fact.’ In 
a global context where people (and therefore also microbes) could move rapidly across the world on the 
backing of an international airline infrastructure, but where the reporting and surveillance mechanisms of 
traditional health infrastructures generally functioned within the office-hours of national disease institutes 
and scientific laboratories, interest emerged in developing faster detection systems that would move 
infectious disease outbreak surveillance closer to ‘real’ time temporalities (Lakoff, 2015).  
One of the first attempts to develop such a novel outbreak detection systems was the Program for 
Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMed-mail). Tracing its origins to the fledgling days of the World 
Wide Web and emerging online interconnectivity in 1994, ProMed-mail was designed as an effort by the 
Federation of American Scientists to streamline emerging practices of global health surveillance. The 
central objective of this first-of-kind online surveillance system was to ‘promote communication amongst 
the international infectious disease community, including scientists, physicians, epidemiologists, public 
health professionals and others interested in infectious diseases on a global scale… [and] to participate in 
discussions on infectious disease concerns, to respond to requests for information, and to collaborate 
together in outbreak investigations and prevention efforts’ (ProMed-mail, 2010). Looking back, ProMed-
mail is now regarded as the original prototype of open-source syndromic surveillance systems for global 
health security (Zhang, Dang, Chen, and Thurmond, 2009).  
The design and purpose of ProMed-mail differed from previous systems of health surveillance 
since its inception. As Lawrence Madoff (2004:227) points out, a founding principle of the new online 
health technology was that it would remain open to all global sources and not just official health data 
produced by government health authorities. The new system would function by harnessing the power of 
personal computers, email and the internet to connect subscribers working in different countries. Those 
subscribers could then use the networked platform to exchange reports and information about new 
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infectious disease outbreaks that they became aware of – irrespective of where they were geographically 
located in the world. Critically, this networked platform meant that the ProMed-mail system could draw 
upon both official data and also report other types of more ‘informal’ material submitted by its subscriber 
base. As it evolved, the system thus gathered information from a diversity of outlets including official 
government health and departmental reports, but also press briefings, bulletins from international 
organisations, as well as professional or personal observations and other open source material of 
subscribed ProMed-mail members, media sources and even local rumours (Cowan, Garland, Hugh-Jones, 
Shimshony, Handysides, Kaye, Madoff, Pollack, and Woodall, 2006:1091). 
Those incoming reports from an array of sources are subsequently analysed by expert subject area 
moderators within the ProMed-mail team. Those experts possess wide-ranging thematic and scientific 
knowledge about bacterial, viral, and parasitic diseases, as well as animal and zoonotic diseases, plant 
disease, epidemiology and entomology (ibid). Through the use of human analytic expertise, and the 
medians of the personalized computer and of the World Wide Web, the ProMed-mail system thus seeks to 
either verify or discredit submitted global health data and to scan the documents for accuracy and 
relevancy. Relevant incoming health reports are also further verified by the ‘top’ moderator on duty 
within the system for additional review and consideration, and with a view to assigning reports an 
urgency rating. An estimated 30 daily disease notification reports are received from ProMed-mail 
subscribers, with an estimated 20 of these reports being forwarded to the Top Moderator on duty for 
further verification (Madoff, 2004:229).  
In the next step, moderators can then assign an urgency rating to the incoming reports. A red 
rating indicates a public health emergency of highest concern. In this case reports are immediately 
uploaded onto the system’s public website, with further notification emails being sent to ProMed-mail 
subscribers on the system listserv. Reports listed as yellow may or may not be uploaded to the website 
with discretion left to the top moderator. Items with low or no urgency are labelled green and sent on for 
further review and finalisation. In terms of its overarching time horizon, this system of outbreak news 
classification and dissemination thus enables infectious disease outbreak reporting to become a daily 
activity, with the ProMed-mail system publishing and uploading seven daily reports, 365 days per year, 
on infectious disease trends.  
ProMed-mail has been incredibly successful at attracting subscribers from around the world. The 
new system may have only counted 40 members at its launch in 1994; but by 1997 interest in novel online 
open-source reporting had already witnessed the growth of the subscriber-base to 11,000 members spread 
across 135 countries. As the initiative approached its tenth anniversary in 2004, ProMed-mail 
membership had nearly tripled to more than 32,000 individuals based in 150 countries. By 2014, and 20 
years following the novel launch of the ProMed-mail, the subscribership consisted of more than 60,000 
members in at least 185 countries (Woodall, 1997; Madoff, 2004; ProMed-mail, 2010). The extensive 
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uptake of the new system is remarkable in and of itself; but it also further extends the system’s geographic 
coverage and penetration because the system allows members to submit information that they encounter 
locally. The more people around the world who use the system, the more information on infectious 
disease outbreaks can be garnered and exchanged. 
With the benefit of hindsight, ProMed-mail marked a pivotal development in the history of 
infectious disease surveillance as a pioneering effort to harness emergent technologies for faster and more 
extensive surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks across the world (Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2010: 
88). In terms of its underlying temporalities, ProMed-mail was able to move closer to the goal of attaining 
real-time reporting by introducing a cycle of daily reporting. Politically, it was far less constrained by 
traditional demarcations of the state and national sovereignty because it was located online and within the 
emergent world of the World Wide Web. Epistemically, it utilised a greater range and volume of sources 
by combining both official and unofficial information sources. Geographically, it achieved ever-greater 
coverage as its membership began to emanate from more and more countries around the world. All of 
those aspects combined to make ProMed-mail quite a revolutionary system of surveillance capable of 
creating a regime of visibility around infectious diseases not previously achievable or available within 
official government programmes of health surveillance. And yet ProMed-mail also remained a 
surveillance system still extensively reliant upon the capacity of human analysts to analyse, translate and 
upload all this relevant reporting of potential infectious disease outbreaks. As innovative a system as it 
was, ProMed-mail did not yet make extensive use of algorithmic technologies.  
 
2. Harnessing the Algorithm: The Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN)  
Only three years after the inception of ProMed-mail another new syndromic surveillance system called 
the Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN) was developed in partnership between the World 
Health Organization (WHO) and Health Canada. Focusing explicitly on open source media reports, the 
operational objective of GHPIN was ‘to determine the feasibility and effectiveness of using news media 
sources to continuously gather information about possible disease outbreaks worldwide, and to rapidly 
alert international bodies of such events’ (Keller, Blench, Tolentino, Freifeld, Mandl, Mawudeku, 
Eysenbach and Brownstein, 2009:690). GPHIN would essentially aim to constantly monitor online news 
and media reports from around the world (and in multiple languages) with the aim of detecting the earliest 
signs of a possible new infectious disease outbreak. 
 The idea for the GPHIN initiative can be traced back to the 1994 outbreak of pneumonic plague 
in India. On 23 September 1994 reports of human infections with pneumonic plague began to surface in 
Surat, a city located within the extremely densely populated state of Gujarat. The outbreak resulted, albeit 
briefly, in an unprecedented panic with serious international ramifications. The perceived rapid spread of 
the Surat Plague in the following days provoked an outward mass flight of an estimated quarter of the 1.5 
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million city-dwellers from Surat across India. The Surat plague thus seemed to capture all the fears of 
how a potentially lethal infectious disease could suddenly break out and then rapidly spread to other 
geographic areas – posing a risk to an ever-growing number of people within and beyond the borders of 
India. 
Surat was certainly not the first outbreak of plague; but it was nevertheless striking because the 
outbreak was exposed, tracked and widely reported upon by an emergent, 24-hour global news media 
(Dutt, Akhtar and McVeigh, 2006; Pallipparambil, 2014). The emergence of increased global 
interconnectivity and digital media at the end of the 20th century meant that media organizations such as 
BBC and CNN would come to report upon the plague situation in Surat, and would widely disseminate 
such unofficial health knowledge to their viewers (Weir and Mykhalovskiy, 2010). Crucially, those media 
reports appeared to come in more quickly than many of the traditional channels of infectious disease 
outbreak reporting (Pallipparambil, 2014). In many respects the media effectively began to constitute an 
alternative, widely-accessible – albeit more informal – disease surveillance network beyond the control of 
national jurisdictions.  
For some the experience of the Surat plague exposed the ways in which official systems of 
infectious disease outbreak reporting were clearly lagging behind the pace of events and media coverage. 
For others, however, such rapid media reporting also represented a critical opportunity to further speed up 
the process of international outbreak detection. If there could be an effective way of continuously 
monitoring such media reports in near real time, this could lead to much earlier warnings about new 
outbreaks than having to wait for the official diplomatic channels of disease notification to run their 
course. The aim of the new GPHIN system would thus be to analyse and report upon emergent and 
probable health data trends by processing mass collated data in the form of international media reports. 
The underlying data would be harnessed and filtered through novel information aggregating technologies. 
Unlike the earlier ProMed-mail system, the operation of GPHIN thus relied heavily on media aggregation 
systems – notably two models called Factiva and Al Bawaba. Factiva is an online multi-lingual, media 
content service owned by the Dow Jones & Company, whereas the Al Bawaba service amasses and 
makes available media reporting sources in Arabic and English. In employing such automated 
surveillance capacities, the GPHIN platform automatically scans these sources every 15 minutes for input 
data to be processed further by a combination of human analytics, as well as automated and algorithmic 
programming (Mawudeku and Blench, 2006:9).   
Indeed, a crucial difference in GPHIN relates to the growing role that automated processes play in 
analysing the data streams. Corresponding to the rise in computing capacities and further refinement of 
the internet, formidable portions of the GPHIN platform became reliant upon automatic-computing and 
digital operation processes to supplement human infectious disease observation, classification and 
reporting. In addition to the design and application of web-crawling programs to continuously extract 
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relevant open-source health data from selected websites, GPHIN thus became the first online health 
syndromic surveillance model to integrate an information retrieval algorithm to further observe, classify 
and filter aggregated incoming data-sources. GPHIN had effectively begun to harness the power of the 
algorithm for speeding up the analysis of incoming reports in a way that ProMed-mail had not. 
In fact, the turn towards algorithmic programming within GPHIN was the key to managing the 
growing volume of continually generating mass online data sets being fed into the system. Through 
automated computing facilities the GPHIN operating platform effectively scans and ‘pulls’ pertinent 
global health media reports in recurrent 15 minute intervals, 24 hours a day, seven days a week from the 
news aggregator systems. It then locates and retrieves from this data, specific words, expressions, phrases 
and syntax relevant to designed health categories within the GPHIN system – including human, animal 
and plant diseases, biological, chemical and radiological risks and natural disasters (Keller, Blench, 
Tolentino, Freifeld, Mandl, Mawudeku, Eysenbach, and Brownstein, 2009:690). It does all of this, 
moreover, with sources in a number of different languages. GPHIN even provides timely and routinized 
automated, machine translation of curated English articles into Arabic, Chinese (simplified and 
traditional), Farsi, French, Russian, Portuguese, and Spanish report formats.  
The incorporation of such algorithmic technologies within the GPHIN platform meant that even 
the initial classification of how significant a new report is could now become automated. The information 
retrieval algorithm, based upon predefined classification by taxonomy, thus automatically processes and 
assigns an initial ‘relevancy score’ by category. This score is ‘derived from the proprietary algorithm 
utilizing the values attributed to the keywords and terms within the taxonomies or taxonomy it has been 
assigned to’ (Blech, 2008:300-302). Through this process of automated observation and calculation, 
incoming health data that receives an assigned ‘high’ relevancy rating are automatically loaded or 
published onto the GPHIN database. Articles listed as immediate concerns are forwarded to the GPHIN 
subscribership base (in which consumers access information based on a fee-access system), and users via 
e-mail while articles deemed redundant or irrelevant are ‘trashed’ and not considered for further risk 
analysis (ibid).  
Overall GPHIN thus signals a move towards greater reliance on algorithmic technologies for the 
purposes of international outbreak detection. Its use of algorithms was critical in enabling GPHIN to 
achieve a speed and volume of information retrieval, processing and filtering not feasible through the use 
of human analytics alone. GPHIN thus became one of the first news-based syndromic surveillance 
systems to replace traditional human labour and analytics with algorithmic processing to construct a 
globalised view of infectious disease risk. The power of this new, algorithmically-based system would 
become evident during the SARS outbreak in late 2002 and early 2003, when GPHIN was able to identify 
signals within the online ‘noise’ of Chinese media sources pointing to the emergence of an unusual strain 
of flu an estimated 11 days after the first outbreak occurred in late 2002. Crucially, GPHIN’s detection 
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preceded the Chinese Ministry of Health’s official notification protocol to the WHO (which only occurred 
on February 7, 2003), as well as the WHO’s first official report on the occurrence which was released to 
the global public on February 25, 2003 detailing the progression of an ‘atypical pneumonia outbreak’ 
(Blench, 2008:300). GPHIN had powerfully demonstrated during the SARS outbreak how – through the 
careful design of new algorithms – mass sets of unofficial, open-source news data could be translated into 
actionable indicators of a possible emerging infectious disease threat (Securing Against Future Events: 
Pre-emption, protocols and publics, 2015). 
 
3. Mapping and Visualising the Outbreaks: The Birth of HealthMap 
2006 witnessed the launch of yet a third automated, internet-based syndromic surveillance system called 
HealthMap. Whereas both ProMed-Mail and GPHIN focused on generating and disseminating 
information about possible infectious disease outbreaks (albeit in very different ways), HealthMap wished 
to go one step further by visualising and aggregating the data in a much more easily accessible and user 
friendly way. HealthMap would do this through use of an online, digital and global mapping system – 
supplemented by a Google Maps plug-in – to neatly visualise the information flows and data-streams 
which could otherwise be overwhelming to the user or that could even ‘obscure important elements of a 
disease outbreak in the era of continually-generating, mass, unintelligible online data’ (Keller, Blench, 
Tolentino, Freifeld, Mandl, Mawudeku, Eysenbach, and Brownstein, 2009:691). The advent of these 
next-generation syndromic surveillance mechanisms like ProMed-mail and GPHIN (as well as other 
systems) meant that more and more information about emergent infectious diseases was becoming 
available – so much so that there was a risk that this mass of online raw data would become 
overwhelming and meaningless without the ability to transcribe and translate their signals accurately, 
reliably and accessibly (Rouvroy, 2015). HealthMap was launched in response to this new challenge of 
‘taming the chaos’ and connecting the predictive dots within continually-generating sets of mass health 
data.  
 The HealthMap system was originally designed as a multi-stream, real-time syndromic 
surveillance platform that monitors and continually aggregates electronic health data on new, ongoing and 
emerging infectious disease outbreaks (Nelson, 2008:596). As Keller, Blench, Tolentino, Freifeld, Mandl, 
Mawudeku, Eysenbach, and Brownstein (2009:691) note, [t]he system integrates online outbreak data 
from multiple electronic and digital sources including online news wires (e.g. Google News), Really 
Simply Syndication (RSS) feeds, expert-curated accounts (e.g. ProMed-mail), multinational surveillance 
reports (e.g. from Eurosurveillance) and validated official alerts (e.g. from WHO). Like ProMed-mail and 
GPHIN, HealthMap thus includes an array of both unofficial sources of data as well, ‘including online 
news aggregators, eyewitness reports, expert-curated discussions and validated official reports, to achieve 
a unified and comprehensive view of the current global state of infectious diseases and their effect on 
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human and animal health’ (HealthMap, 2016). Yet in building upon the premise that such ‘raw’ electronic 
data-sources were not yet well organized or integrated (Freifeld, Mandl, Reis, and Brownstein, 2008:150), 
the HealthMap platform utilised automated web-crawling and web-scraping programming to scan the 
internet on a continual, 24 hour a day, 365 days a year basis, collecting up to 20,000 online sources per 
hour – all with the view of better organizing and displaying this data in a more readily accessible manner.  
 A further innovation of the HealthMap system thus pertains to what happens next. All of this 
relevant aggregated raw data is subsequently loaded onto the HealthMap operating platform, where 
incoming disease outbreak reports are converted into standard ‘alert’ formats containing the fields of 
‘headline’, ‘date’, ‘description’ and ‘info text’. This information is then forwarded into an automated 
classification system that strips down and simplifies data sets in order to determine the precise geographic 
and epidemiological information associated with each alert. Text processing algorithms further juxtapose 
and link incoming data alongside an integrated in-system dictionary, which contains approximately 1800 
disease conditions along with 5000 global geographic patterns including countries, capital and major 
cities, regions etc. The incoming text data is further stripped of any non-alphanumeric content and is then 
automatically matched alongside the HealthMap dictionary for correlation and classification between the 
simplified data sets and the listed geographic locations and disease conditions automatically generated by 
the HealthMap system.  
 Following this initial classification and geocoding performed through the use of algorithms, a 
further automated process within HealthMap then collects and tallies the number of alerts, feeds and 
updates obtained online about the specific occurrence of an outbreak of infectious disease within a single 
geographic location. The system also uses a programmed sorting algorithm in order to determine the 
‘heat’ or relevance based upon a 1-10 integer scale for each disease in each location. Finally, this 
classified, translated and ranked global health reporting is then overlaid on an interactive [online] map for 
user-friendly access to the original report, enabling the easy viewing of the present, real-time state of 
global infectious disease outbreaks occurring anywhere around the globe (Keller, Blench, Tolentino, 
Freifeld, Mandl, Mawudeku, Eysenbach, and Brownstein, 2009:692). Like GPHIN before it, HealthMap 
too thus replaces the previous surveillant procedures of human observation with the more automated, 
continually generating capacities of digital technology and algorithmic logics. Indeed, the core objective 
of HealthMap was to ‘allow for greater possibilities in extracting structure algorithmically from a variety 
of disparate data sources’ (Freifeld, Mandl, Reis, and Brownstein., 2008:151). 
 HealthMap’s ability to do so successfully was powerfully demonstrated when it detected signs of 
a strange fever occurring in Macenta, Guinea on 14 March 2014. That crucial signal was detected one 
week before the Guinean Ministry of Health officially confirmed an outbreak of the Ebola virus that 
would go on to become the largest outbreak of Ebola in human history. The Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa had showed how HealthMap’s largely automated surveillance platform, powered by innovative 
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algorithmic technologies, was able to capture and identify specific signals, signs or aberrations of a new 
outbreak within a massive data-set. It had shown how the use of carefully designed algorithms could help 
reconcile the double-pronged problématique of Big Data – which is both potentially telling and yet 
seemingly infinite and unintelligible at the same time.   
More broadly, the launch of the HealthMap system represented yet another step along the 
continuum towards real-time identification of potential or emergent infectious disease outbreaks. 
ProMed-mail had sought to create an online, real-time forum for the exchange of open-source health 
information; but the system remained contingent upon the temporalities of the early and emergent World 
Wide Web. GPHIN had subsequently sought to expand the dimensions of near-real time temporality 
through the utilisation of then cutting-edge innovations in web crawling programming, retrieval 
algorithms and simultaneous computer-translating capacities. HealthMap, in turn, marked the first online 
syndromic surveillance system of the Web 2.0 era, and represented a further step in the move towards 
capturing the ‘real-time’ in health surveillance reporting. It used algorithmic technologies to further 
accelerate real-time temporalities of health surveillance through the online visualisation, chronological 
mapping and open-access presentations of geographies of risk derived from data. Functioning largely 
through automated computing, supported to an extent by human curation to correct misclassifications and 
examine geographic coverage (ibid), and fully supplemented by algorithmic programming for precise 
information classification and geocoding, the HealthMap project reflects the latest trajectory in the 
growing integration of algorithmic programming into processes for global outbreak detection.  
 
4. Syndromic Surveillance and Algorithmic Governmentality 
The evolutionary arc of these of these novel syndromic surveillance systems over the past two decades 
has moved algorithms to the core of global outbreak detection. As a pioneering online forum of infectious 
disease information exchange, ProMed-mail represented a novel response to the problem of outbreak 
detection utilising the emerging power of the personal computer and the internet; but it still fell short of 
harnessing the power of the automated algorithm. GPHIN, with its subsequent integration of 
informational retrieval algorithms, signalled the transition to a more specifically algorithmic tactic of 
surveillance by automatically processing a vast volume of news data becoming openly available through 
online media outlets. HealthMap, in yet a further transformation, marked the rise of whole-scale 
implementation of automated computing processes and algorithmic programming within a single 
operating platform. Such growing reliance on algorithms signals a significant shift in terms of how 
knowledge is problematized, the kinds of knowledge that is produced, and also the underlying role of 
knowledge in contemporary security practices. 
 
4.1. The Problem of Knowledge: From Scarcity to Excess 
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The prominent role that algorithmic technologies now play in these syndromic surveillance systems 
points to a pivotal change in the underlying problem of knowledge. Traditional systems of health 
surveillance were moored within national health institutes and scientific laboratories with specialist 
infectious disease knowledge – frequently taking the form of population records, health and laboratory 
reports, and so forth. These products of health knowledge tended to be time-consuming and costly to 
produce, as well as being almost entirely reliant on human-observation and analytics for curation. 
However, they were essentially geared towards creating new knowledge for the art of governing the 
health of populations in a context where there was previously very little, or even no, such knowledge 
available.  
The rapid rise of the algorithm within syndromic surveillance systems, by contrast, responds not 
so much to a problem of information scarcity, but – on the contrary – to an underlying problem of data 
excess. The core challenge for syndromic surveillance is how to process an ever increasing volume of 
more indirect and informal information indicating that an outbreak may have occurred. ProMed-mail 
became the first syndromic surveillance system to seek to address this changing problematization of 
knowledge through its novel use of a transnational, digital platform for information exchange. The system 
recognised that there had been a proliferation of multiple new data sources, including many informal ones 
that could be better harnessed for the purposes of rapid outbreak detection. ProMed-mail was able to 
successfully connect these different data sources (principally via electronic mail and the internet), but the 
scale of the information flow was such that it could still be managed largely through human analysis. The 
turn towards monitoring the much vaster information ecology of online news media in the search for 
possible outbreaks through the GPHIN system, however, posed an additional challenge. There were so 
many media reports being constantly generated that they could no longer be processes in a speedy and 
cost-effective way through the use of human analytics alone – necessitating the introduction of automated 
sorting and retrieval algorithms. The subsequent co-existence of multiple such surveillance systems, 
together with a proliferation of other data sources, would see a further intensification in the recourse to 
algorithms through the launch of HealthMap system, which was largely sustained and regulated by 
algorithmic processing and automated computing. The turn to algorithms in these surveillance systems 
thus represents an attempt to tame the ‘chaos’ of excessive and constantly generating data-flows that are 
impossible to process solely by utilising human analytics alone. In the move from traditional public health 
surveillance to syndromic surveillance, the underlying problem of knowledge has, in many ways, become 
exactly reversed. 
 
4.2. Proxy Data – or ‘Knowledge Without Truth’ 
The extensive reliance on algorithms also generates a new type of knowledge for governing global health 
security. Much of the knowledge produced by these next-generation syndromic surveillance systems is, 
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strictly speaking, more of a ‘surface’ knowledge of indirect signs and proxy signals. In his lectures on 
governmentality, Foucault had famously discussed the rise of statistics as a new form of knowledge for 
governing populations. The lectures even illustrated the importance of such statistical knowledge 
specifically in relation to the problem of governing infectious diseases – focusing on the example of 
smallpox and inoculation practices of 18th century Europe (2007:10). In that case statistical science – 
applied to the living, biological world – sought to render visible and intelligible ‘how many people are 
infected with smallpox, at what age, with what effects, with what mortality rate’.  
 The new surveillance systems explored above, however, have used a combination of algorithms 
and open-source data to generate a different kind of knowledge. They are part of a knowledge regime of 
electronic and digitised signs, codes and signals. They produce, in the words of Antoinette Rouvroy, a 
kind of ‘knowledge without truth’. By this she means, firstly, that knowledge is no longer produced, as 
within previous truth regimes, through the collection, quantification and utilisation of human logic, but by 
‘building upon the factual availability of enormous amounts of raw digital data’ (Rouvroy, 2012:3-7). 
Secondly, it means that knowledge generated by algorithmic processes increasingly escapes the previous 
systems of verification including the kinds of trials, tests, examinations and experiments that were viewed 
as essential to ‘attest to the robustness, truth, validity and legitimacy of claims and hypothesis about 
reality’, within previous governmental regimes of truth (ibid).  
 The emergence of this new kind of ‘surface’ knowledge in the area of global health security 
became evident in 1994 when the new ProMed-mail system began to depart from previous health 
surveillance systems by also processing and curating non-official, non-clinical open-source information. 
The system thus marked a considerable ‘loosening’ of the inclusion criteria for suitable outbreak data that 
could be considered. GPHIN subsequently utilised the emergent World Wide Web as a forum in which to 
communicate and disseminate an unofficial and largely digitized form of ‘surface’ knowledge gained 
from online media sources. The launch of HealthMap in 2006 represented yet a further step in this 
direction through the introduction of largely automated surveillance platform. Indeed, HealthMap 
deployed algorithmic processing to determine correlations between captured raw data-feed and to 
visualise a truly networked, digitised view of present global health trends informed entirely from patterns 
and signals within data-sets contra official statistical verification and scientific confirmations of previous 
systems of knowledge. Overall, those novel syndromic surveillance systems are premised less on 
transcribing actual cases of illness and/or outbreaks, and are more geared toward the interception of 
unmediated data-flows – always seeking to harness data-points and correlations towards greater 
intelligibility and visibility of the probable or potential. However, in the end all the indirect and non-
clinical data utilised by these syndromic surveillance systems to generate early warnings may – or may 
not – be indicative of an actual disease outbreak. 
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4.3. From the Normal to the Exceptional          
The rise of the algorithm in these syndromic surveillance systems also signals a shift in the underlying 
role that knowledge performs in contemporary security practices. In presenting the epistemic 
transformation between a disciplinary economy of power towards that of a governmental economy of 
power in his Security, Territory, Population lecture series, Foucault sought to make distinct the particular 
ways in which populations are ‘normalized’ through the identification and modification of risk groups 
(Foucault, 2007:63). Unlike a disciplinary economy of power whereby ‘an ideal norm is imposed from 
the outside, and the distinction between the normal and the abnormal is undertaken according to this 
‘artificial’ norm (ibid), the concept of normalization within Foucault’s governmentality once more was 
very heavily influenced by the dynamics of statistical analysis and of the cultivation of an average to 
determine abnormality and relative risk. Accordingly, normalization – as described within Foucault’s 
understanding of governmentality – constituted ‘the plotting of the normal and the abnormal, of different 
curves or normality, and the operation of normalization consists in establishing an interplay between these 
different distributions of normality’ (2007:63). Fearnley (2008) has shown that such processes of 
normalization were central within previous governmental strategies of public health, especially through 
the establishment of regulatory mechanisms aimed at the development of an average or an equilibrium 
within the overarching governance and optimisation of population health (2008:1617). However, those 
past systems of public health and the governance of risk were also frequently limited by costs, external 
conditions, and most significantly limitations within existent possibilities of knowledge (ibid).   
The syndromic surveillance systems analysed here depart from the centrality of the norm and 
from the optimal statistical distribution for governing the health of populations. Rather than seeking to 
plot the normal versus the abnormal to determine the norm through interplay of facts, statistics and 
figures, algorithmically driven syndromic surveillance systems constantly survey in order to detect, 
determine and report upon that which constitutes the exception within the governance of infectious 
diseases. This divergence from traditional public health surveillance was already evident in the rationale 
for designing the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMed-mail), which – from its inception 
– sought to locate and report upon emergent infectious disease outbreaks, as opposed to determining 
averages and relative norms of existing disease trends within populations. GPHIN too was orientated not 
towards measuring and assessing the global burden of infectious disease amongst populations, but 
specifically to capturing the emergence of new infectious disease outbreaks. The same holds true for the 
algorithmic processes that capture, match and upload online mass-data sets to HealthMap. HealthMap too 
seeks to visualise aberrations not averages, as illustrated by the syndromic surveillance system’s initial 
detection of a ‘mysterious fever’ occurring in Macenta, Guinea on 14 March 2014.  
Collectively these syndromic surveillance systems are thus beginning to re-contour 
understandings of the norm and the average through what Rouvroy (2015), highlights as the non-
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selectivity and exhaustive nature of ‘Big Data’ and algorithmic processing. Where the cultivation of the 
norm within governmentality involved the plotting of statistical points and seeking to bring what was 
considered abnormal into the fold of the ‘norm’, the idea of the average within algorithmic 
governmentality disappears completely with the capacity for automated computing and algorithmic logic 
to effectively capture and present all relevant points of data, no matter how distant. Unlike the previous 
generation of statistical knowledge, whereby points or data which deviated too far from a central or 
common finding were disregarded, the infinite scope and capacity of algorithmic programming means 
that even the most isolated or singular of points can now be taken into greater analysis, specification and 
account (ibid). In the end, the rise of the algorithm within the context of these new syndromic surveillance 
systems signals not only a change in the nature and problem of knowledge within contemporary security 
practices, but also in its underlying role and purpose. 
 
Conclusion 
The three syndromic surveillance systems analysed in this article differ considerably. Yet viewed 
collectively they also show that algorithmic programming has become progressively more central to the 
practice of global health security. As the earliest of the three outbreak detection systems, ProMed-mail 
was the only system not to explicitly utilise algorithmic programming. Nonetheless, it represented an 
early attempt to harness and curate the knowledge available from freely available and exchangeable, 
open-source health data – thus marking a significant deviation from the more traditional utilisation of 
statistical practices and official health knowledge in health surveillance. ProMed-mail may have still 
relied on human analytics rather than algorithmic programming, but it laid the operational groundwork 
from which a more advanced integration of algorithmic technologies would soon become possible.  
Such integration of algorithmic programming into syndromic surveillance was subsequently 
achieved through the development of the Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN). As one of 
the first digitally-interconnected, semi-automated health surveillance system, GPHIN sought to integrate 
leading machine translation and automated/digital processes to develop an online health system with a 
‘real-time’, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week surveillance capacity (Mawudeku and Blench, 2006:7-11; Weir 
and Mykhalovskiy, 2010: 84-85). It explicitly introduced an information sorting and retrieval algorithm in 
response to the growing volume and complexity of information available on the internet during the early 
days of GPHIN. Here the launch of the GPHIN initiative also coincided historically with the turn of the 
millennium – a time during which personal computer usage, consumption of online information, and 
expanding access to the World Wide Web increased considerably.  
HealthMap signalled yet a further step towards a fully automated surveillance platform. Sustained 
and informed even more extensively by algorithmic programming, HealthMap requires only minimal 
human analytics for precise geocoding, infectious disease classification, outbreak alert report curation, 
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and interactive visualisation of ongoing infectious disease trends globally. Indeed, and of the three 
systems to emerge between 1994 and 2006, HealthMap represents the most extensive and sustained effort 
yet to harness the power of the algorithm for the purposes of strengthening global health security. The 
iterative evolution of these new syndromic surveillance systems –from ProMed-mail, via GPHIN, through 
to HealthMap – has thus pushed algorithmic technologies to the centre of international outbreak detection. 
 The turn to algorithms for strengthening global health security signals a considerable shift in the 
underlying problem, nature, and role of knowledge within contemporary security practices. The initial 
introduction of the algorithm responds to an underlying problem of knowledge no longer characterised by 
a situation of a scarcity of data relating to probable outbreaks of infectious disease; but rather by an 
excess of constantly expanding and generating data mass that may contain patterns, associations and 
correlations indicative of yet-unforeseen public health emergencies. Indeed, the very development of 
these new syndromic surveillance systems is predicated upon the conviction that existent forms of 
knowledge generation within health security are insufficient for addressing contemporary concerns 
regarding the threat of globalised pandemic and infectious disease outbreaks (Lakoff, 2015). Through the 
introduction of algorithmic technologies, moreover, syndromic surveillance systems then generate a new 
and quite different kind of knowledge – more of a ‘surface’ knowledge of indirect digital signs and 
signals that may enable faster responses and earlier interventions. Nor is the function of this new 
knowledge even still that of normalization as described in Foucault’s influential account of 
governmentality. Whereas normalization sought to establish a particular norm through ‘the plotting of the 
normal and the abnormal, of different curves or normality, and the operation of normalization consists in 
establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality’ (2007:63), syndromic 
surveillance systems move towards the detection of the exceptional or the aberrant within mass data sets.  
Do all of these changes also point to a deeper transformation in the political rationality of 
security? On the one hand, all three systems considered here still remain continuous with the central 
aspects of governmentality described by Michel Foucault. Foucault famously referred to governmentality 
as ‘the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that 
allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical 
instrument’ (2007:108; Collier and Lakoff,, 2015:26). The surveillance systems analysed in this article 
remain continuous with that notion of governmentality in that they too are all geared towards securing the 
welfare of populations – in this case against the death and illnesses that could be caused by new infectious 
diseases (Elbe, 2009; Elbe, Roemer-Mahler, and Long, 2014). It would thus be premature to speak of a 
complete transformation, or even break, in the underlying rationality of security. 
 At the same time, we have seen that the close integration of algorithmic technologies into 
processes of global outbreak detection does signal a distinct shift or inflection within Foucault’s 
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influential understanding of governmentality – especially in terms of how security knowledge is today 
problematized, understood, and the wider role it performs. Antoinette Rouvroy has usefully coined the 
term ‘algorithmic governmentality’ to capture the emergence of a new governmental rationality made 
possible by the growing complexity of information technology – one that ‘utilises algorithmic processes 
of data-aggregation, translation and prediction’ and that is ‘chiefly oriented towards the neutralisation of 
potentiality (Rouvroy, 2009). The syndromic surveillance systems analysed here constitute evidence that 
such a specifically algorithmic governmentality is also beginning to manifest itself more fully in the area 
of global health security. More than that, they show that attempts to strengthen global health security – 
with its dual concern about the threat posed by pandemics and bioterrorist attacks – have actually been a 
key driver behind the international development, enhancement and proliferation of new algorithmic 
security systems. 
As with debates about the utility of ‘Big Data’ more generally, pertinent questions still remain 
about how effective, accurate and reliable these new syndromic surveillance systems are overall. This 
issue emerges particularly clearly in relation to Google Flu Trends. The system sought to improve early 
detection through the monitoring of ‘health-seeking behaviour in the form of queries to online search 
engines, which are submitted by millions of users around the world each day’ (Ginsberg, Mohebbi, 
Matthew, Patel, Brammer, Smolinski, and Brilliant, 2009:1012)’. The idea behind the system was that as 
people began to suffer from the flu, they would be likely to search the internet for information on flu 
symptoms and remedies. It might thus be possible to trace the patterns of such search activities, and to 
aggregate this data into ‘historical logs of online web search queries’, in order to predict the onset and 
scale of the flu outbreak (ibid). Initially, the system attracted a lot of positive attention and acclaim after 
reports that it was considerably quicker than the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 
identifying the onset and scale of seasonal flu the United States (Ginsberg, Mohebbi, Matthew, Patel, 
Brammer, Smolinski, and Brilliant, 2009). However, it later emerged that the system was not nearly as 
powerful or accurate when in 2012, when the system ‘identified a sudden surge of flu cases but overstated 
the amount’ (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier, 2013:2-3). More recently, there has thus been prominent 
coverage of the ‘failure’ of the digital surveillance system Google Flu Trends to accurately predicting 
oncoming seasonal influenza arcs (Butler, 2013; Lazer, Kennedy, King, and Vespignani 2014). The 
uneven experience with Google Flu Trends thus serves as a pertinent reminder that the accuracy and 
effectiveness of these new surveillance systems remains an open question. 
In the end, however, it is not just the effectiveness of such systems that matters. Beyond their 
accuracy, the very existence and introduction of such new systems can also have wider political 
ramifications. In the case of global health security there is evidence that the introduction of new 
syndromic surveillance systems is already changing the way states are identifying outbreaks and 
exercising their sovereignty. The revised International Health Regulations (2005), for example, officially 
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authorized the utilisation of such unofficial health data generated by these surveillance models to further 
inform and guide responses to emergent and probable public health emergencies. Indeed, as early as 2001 
Health Canada and the WHO entered into an agreement that GPHIN would supply WHO with monitoring 
data while the WHO would engage in verification processes with its member-state contacts, officially 
consolidating the GPHIN surveillance system within the operational frameworks of the WHO’s Global 
Outbreak Alert Response Network (GOARN) (Heymann and Rodier, 2001;2004). In that sense, 
syndromic surveillance systems have formed a significant part of the global outbreak surveillance 
landscape for more than a decade now. 
The existence of these new systems will likely also bear on the deliberations of governments 
regarding their decisions about whether and how quickly to report new infectious outbreaks to the rest of 
the international community. David Fidler (2004:144), argues that such ‘unofficial health information and 
global alerts now act as a global health governance pincer that squeezes the state’s sovereign decision of 
whether to report outbreak information and to cooperate with the WHO and other countries.’ 
Governments considering whether or not to rapidly declare a new outbreak to the international 
community will now need to weigh up the chances that others will become aware of the outbreak through 
such syndromic surveillance systems, or that they may even be aware of an outbreak already. Although it 
is difficult to determine the precise motivations and actions of governments, evidence is emerging that the 
introduction of such syndromic surveillance systems appears to be having an effect. For example, a 
quantitative assessment in the timeliness of infectious disease outbreak reporting (Chan, Brewer, Madoff, 
Pollack, Sonricker, Keller, Freifeld, Blench, Mawudeku, and, Brownstein, 2010) points to a shortening of 
the interval between detection and public communication of outbreaks since the introduction of these new 
systems. In either case, however, the progressive integration of algorithms into global outbreak detection 
is already giving rise to a more nuanced and diversified global health surveillance regime in which, as 
Weir and Mykhalovskiy (2010:104) argue, ‘[s]overeign states did not disappear at the turn of the 21st 
century, but they are now reactive to the presence of a transnationalized system of outbreak 
communication that they themselves have politically and legally authorized.’ 
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